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Abstract
In the market game presented here, sellers o¤er trade mechanisms to buyers, and
buyers randomize over the sellers they visit. The distribution of buyers across sellers is
endogenous and depends on all of the transaction opportunities existing in the market.
Sellers choose from a broad class of trade mechanisms; the only constraints imposed
on mechanisms is that they are direct, incentive compatible, and anonymous. In the
(subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an e¢ cient
reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers
and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the
market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and vanishes in
the limit. The model sheds light on the endogenous formation of trading institutions
in decentralized markets.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a decentralized model of trade in which sellers compete for a common
pool of customers by way of designing trade mechanisms. This type of competition arises
in a variety of decentralized markets, e.g. markets for real estate, rental housing, used
cars, and goods traded via the Internet. The model analyzes the endogenous formation of
trading institutions in a setting where sellers o¤er trade mechanisms to buyers, and buyers
decide which seller to go to. The distribution of buyers across sellers depends on all the
trade mechanisms existing in the market. Sellers are free to use essentially any transaction
mechanism; the only constraints imposed on mechanisms is that they are direct, incentive
compatible, and anonymous.
The main purpose of this paper is to describe the trade mechanisms that sellers will
use in the (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this decentralized trading game. I explore
how the structure of the transaction mechanisms shapes the distribution process of buyers
across sellers, and I formulate the mechanism design problem of a seller who competes with
other sellers. Although this model paints a highly stylized picture of trade, and abstracts
from many of the institutional details of each of the aforementioned markets, it helps gain
valuable insights into the nature of competition by mechanism design and the distribution
of rents in such decentralized trading environments. By obtaining an explicit solution for
the equilibrium trade mechanism, the analysis provides a number of comparative statics
results, and states testable implications that are not available in the standard monopoly
framework.
In the symmetric (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this model sellers hold auctions.
These auctions have a trivial reserve price (equal to sellersuse value of the good) and
involve an entry fee. The equilibrium entry fee depends on the number of buyers and
sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market.
The departure from the monopoly paradigm changes markedly the results from the received
literature on auctions with entry (see e.g. Levin and Smith 1994). It raises a variety of
new questions and yields a number of new insights. First, in contrast to the monopoly
formulation of the model, sellers in general do not expropriate the entire surplus from
buyers. Second and perhaps most surprising nding is that in some circumstances the
availability of one additional seller can raise rather than diminish the entry fees used by
sellers in equilibrium. Finally, when the number of buyers and sellers increases, but their
ratio remains the same (i.e. the thickness of the market increases), the entry fee decreases,
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and in the limit converges to zero. The competition among sellers intensies with the size
of the market, and in large markets sellers receive a lower surplus compared to buyers. For
instance, in a market with 2 buyers and 2 sellers only, buyers receive on average 40% of
the total surplus generated by trade. In contrast, in a market populated by 1000 buyers
and 1000 sellers, buyers receive 71.8% of the trade surplus.
The existing literature on competition in trade mechanisms has taken two distinct mod-
elling approaches. The one strand of this literature considers markets with innitely many
buyers and sellers. Appealing to large markets, McAfee (1993), Peters (1997), and Peters
and Severinov (1997) propose concepts of a market equilibrium that combine elements of
game-theoretical and competitive-equilibrium analysis. These equilibrium notions require,
that if a seller deviates to another mechanism, there will be no consequences for the ex-
pected payo¤ of bidders who visit other sellers. This approach allows the formulation
of tractable frameworks within which the discussion of equilibrium trade mechanisms is
possible. Yet, it remains unclear whether results based on these competitive notions of
equilibrium have any bearing on markets with a small number of buyers and sellers, or
even how they can be applied to markets with a large but nite number of agents (see
McAfee 1993, p.1303). The approach presented here, in contrast, will be genuinely game-
theoretical and will capture all the repercussions that one sellers transaction mechanism
has on the payo¤s of other market participants. The paper enriches this literature in three
respects. First, it provides an explicit solution for the equilibrium mechanisms of markets
of any size, thus covering the gap between the monopoly and the perfectly competitive
case. Second, it reconrms the ndings by McAfee (1993) and Peters (1997) by demon-
strating that in the limit, when the number of buyers and sellers converges to innity, the
equilibrium trade mechanisms indeed converge to an auction with a trivial reserve price
and a zero entry fee. This limit is taken with respect to the subgame perfect equilibria
rather than obtained at the cost of assuming away strategic e¤ects. Finally, the model
allows a comparative statics analysis with respect to the number of buyers and sellers that
cannot be conducted when the number of agents is innite.
The other strand of this literature (e.g., Hernando-Veciana 2005, Burguet and Sakovics
1999, Moldovanu, Sella, and Shi 2008) models competition among sellers who choose reserve
prices in second-price auctions.1 This assumption creates tractable settings by allowing a
sellers transaction mechanism to be described by a single variable. Here, in contrast, the
1The model by Moldovanu, Sella, and Shi (2008) is a multi-unit auction model in which sellers use
uniform-price auctions.
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use of auctions will be a derived result rather than an assumption, and, as we will see,
sellers prefer to use entry fees rather than reserve prices.
This paper is also related to the body of literature that endogenizes the bidder entry
process into a single auction (see McAfee and McMillan 1987b, Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1993,
Levin and Smith 1994, Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou 2001). Entry is associated with
a xed cost and proceeds until the expected gain from participating in the auction is
entirely dissipated (i.e. is equal to the cost of entering the market). When bidders have
independent private values, the seller optimally sets a trivial reserve price (equal to his use
value of the good), and possibly a positive entry fee that fully expropriates buyer surplus.2
This paper follows a similar modelling approach, but accommodates any number of buyers
and sellers. The availability of multiple sellers has signicant implications. Interestingly,
and somewhat counter-intuitively, there are circumstances in which a higher number of
sellers leads to higher entry fees. The availability of more sellers means more transaction
opportunities to buyers, and as a consequence, more buyers are willing to incur the cost
of entering the market. In some circumstances an individual seller who raises his entry fee
will see a smaller outow of buyers when there are other sellers present in the market. This
e¤ect occurs because buyers distribute across the higher number of sellers rather than leave
the market. Yet, in contrast to the literature on monopoly, in the imperfect competition
case sellers do not always expropriate the entire surplus from buyers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market game and
Section 3 o¤ers an overview of the results. The main statements and theorems are collected
in Section 4. Section 5 presents comparative statics results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There is a nite number of sellers indexed by j 2 J and a nite number of buyers indexed
by i 2 I, and I will use J (I) to denote both the set and number of sellers (buyers). Each
seller has one unit for sale of a homogeneous good, and each buyer seeks to buy one unit.
All agents are risk neutral. The use value of the good is the same for each seller, and
without loss of generality is normalized to zero. Sellers compete by simultaneously o¤ering
trade mechanisms to buyers. Each buyer decides whether to enter the market, and which
seller to go to. Entry into the market is associated with xed costs of c  0. These costs
2The entry fee, however, is not raised beyond the point which causes bidders to stay out of the market
with positive probability.
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might, for example, be either transportation costs or the costs a bidder incurs to inspect
the good for sale and learn his valuation. These might also be the costs associated with
the preparation and submission of a bid. Upon visiting a seller, each bidder learns his
valuation and submits a bid.3 Every buyer has a privately observed valuation, which is an
independent draw from a distribution with support normalized to [0; 1] and a continuously
di¤erentiable distribution function F . A mechanism prescribes an allocation and a payment
for any number (and identity) of bidders and any realization of their valuations.4 Let us
denote the set of the subsets (the power set) of all bidders by I and the power set of all
rivals of bidder i by I i. Let s 2 I denote a group of bidders and let xs be the ordered
vector5 of their valuations. Further, let Xs denote the set of all possible ordered vectors
of valuations of the bidders from group s. We denote by X  S
s2I
Xs the set of all ordered
vectors of the valuations of all subsets of bidders and by x an element of this set6. Similarly,
X i denotes the set of ordered vectors of the valuations of all subsets of bidders that do
not contain bidder i.
2.1 Seller strategy space (trade mechanisms)
A mechanism consists of an allocation rule, pi : X ! [0; 1]; and a payment rule, zi : X ! R.
The allocation rule maps biddersmessages (bids) into a probability of winning for each
bidder i 2 I, and the payment rule maps biddersmessages into an expected payment of
each bidder i to the seller. I denote the strategy set of sellers by
A 
n
f(pi; zi)gi2I j (pi; zi) : X ! [0; 1] R
o
;
3Following the modelling approach by Levin and Smith (1994) buyers are assumed to know only the
distribution of their valuations at the time of entering the market. An alternative assumption would
be that buyers know their valuations before entering the market (see Samuelson 1985). The appropriate
assumption is an empirical matter, and depends on the analyzed market. Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2007)
have recently developed a nonparametric test for randomized entry. Their empirical application concerns
bidding data for surface paving and grading contracts let by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation
during the period Jan 02 Dec 05. Their ndings lend support to the Levin and Smiths (1994) hypothesis
of randomized entry over that of selective entry according to Samuelsons (1985) model.
4 In this framework the revelation principle applies. Therefore, without loss of generality, I will consider
direct revelation mechanisms only.
5By ordered vector xs I refer to the vector of valuations of the bidders from a subset s, in which the
components are ordered in an ascending order according to the bidders number.
6Note that the valuation of each bidder i, xi, might or might not appear in the vector x depending on
whether this bidder participates in the mechanism or not.
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and require the allocation and payment rules to satisfy conditions (P ), (F ), (AN) and (IC)
given below. The mechanism of seller j is denoted by Aj , and the vector of the mechanisms
of all sellers by A = (A1; A2; : : : ; AJ).
 (P) Participation. pi(xs) = 0; zi(xs) = 0; 8i 62 s: Only buyers who participate in a
certain mechanism can win the object and be required to pay.
 (F) Feasibility. PIi=1 pi(x)  1;8x 2 X: The allocation rule does not allow more
units to be sold than physically available for any realization of buyer valuations.7
 (AN) Anonymity. Sellers do not discriminate among buyers on characteristics di¤er-
ent than their bids. In other words, the chances of winning and the payment cannot
depend on the buyersidentities but solely on their bids. Formally, the functions p
and z are required to be permutation invariant. This means permuting the valuations
of any ordered vector x 2 X permutes the vectors p(x) and z(x) in the same fashion.8
 (IC) Incentive compatibility:
Assume bidder i participates in mechanism Aj . At the time of bidding, he knows his
valuation xi and the set of bidders who participate in the same mechanism. Because
I require mechanisms be anonymous, the probability of winning the item, and the
payment of bidder i depend only on the number of his rivals, and not on their identity.
Let the number of all bidders visiting seller j be n. If bidder i reports the valuation
~xi; and all other bidders report truthfully, the expected probability of winning the
7For some realizations of x the inequality is allowed hold. The strict inequality would hold, for instance,
when the mechanism is a second-price auction with a positive reservation price. In this case, if the valuation
of the participating bidders are below the sellers reserve price, the seller will retain the item.
8Let

p1(); p2(); : : : ; pI()

and

z1(); z2(); : : : ; zI()

denote the vectors of probability and allocation
functions, respectively. Let (xk; xl; xs) denote the ordered vector of valuations of the bidders from the group
s and the bidders l; k 62 s: Permutation invariance implies:
pk(xk; xl; x
s) = pl(xl; xk; x
s); zk(xk; xl; x
s) = zl(xl; xk; x
s);
pi(xk; xl; x
s) = pi(xl; xk; x
s); zi(xk; xl; x
s) = zi(xl; xk; x
s);8l; k;8i 2 s;8s:
The anonymity condition is sometimes called "equal treatment"; see McAfee (1993) and Peters (1994) for
equivalent formulations.
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item and the expected payment will respectively be
P
(n)
Aj
( ~xi) :=
Z
pi( ~xi; x
(n 1))dF (x(n 1));
Z
(n)
Aj
( ~xi) :=
Z
zi( ~xi; x
(n 1))dF (x(n 1));
where x(n 1) is the vector of other biddersbids, pi( ~xi; x(n 1)) is the allocation rule,
and zi( ~xi; x(n 1)) is the payment rule of mechanism Aj . The incentive compatibility
condition states bidder i nds it protable to report truthfully if all other bidders do
so, i.e. the following inequality9 holds10 for every n and every ~xi 2 [0; 1]:
E
(n)
Aj
( ~xi j xi) =: xi  P (n)Aj ( ~xi)  Z
(n)
Aj
( ~xi)
 xi  P (n)Aj (xi)  Z
(n)
Aj
(xi)  E(n)Aj (xi j xi) =: E
(n)
Aj
(xi):
In this model, the individual rationality condition will be contained in the equilibrium
concept where buyersentry decision is modelled.
2.2 Buyer strategy space
Conditional on observing the mechanisms on o¤er, each buyer chooses which seller to go
to. Buyers randomize across the set of sellers and the option to stay out of the market. A
buyers strategy, mi : AJ ! (J[o) is a mapping from the set of sellerstrade mechanisms
into the set of probability distributions over the sellers, J , and the option to staying out
of the market denoted by o.11
9E
(n)
Aj
( ~xi j xi) is the expected payment of a bidder, who has a valuation of xi and reports the valuation
~xi in the mechanism Aj .
10The requirement that sellers use incentive compatible mechanisms is without loss of generality. In the
present setting buyers submit bids after they learn their valuations and the number of their fellow bidders
(but not their valuations). Thus, sellersmechanisms described here are standard Bayesian games for which
the revelation principle applies (see Myerson 1997, p. 260).
11Buyers indeed play a behavior strategy because at every "node" (or subgame) dened by a prole of
trade mechanisms, they choose the probability of visiting each seller (and the probability of staying out of
the market).
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2.3 Payo¤s
As I focus on anonymous mechanisms, only the number, but not identity, of the rivals of
bidder i matters for his payo¤. When bidder i visits seller j with a probability of one, and
all other bidders visit this seller with a probability of m, the expected payo¤ of bidder i is
given by
Rij(Aj ;m) =
IX
n=1
Pr[n  1;m] 
Z 1
0
E
(n)
Aj
(xi)dF (xi)  c;
where
Pr[n  1;m] =
IX
n=1

I   1
n  1

mn 1(1 m)I n
is the binomial probability with which bidder i faces (n 1) rivals. If all buyers go to seller
j with a probability of m, the expected payo¤ of seller j is
j(Aj ;m) = Pr[n;m] 
Z 1
0
Z
(n)
j (xi)dF (xi);
where
Pr[n;m] =

I
n

mn(1 m)I n
and the probability that exactly n bidders go to seller j. The strategy of bidder i is
denoted by
mi() =

mi0();mi1();mi2() : : : ;miJ()

:
To economize on notation, let all other bidders play the (same) mixed strategy
m i() =

m i0 ();m i1 ();m i2 () : : : ;m iJ ()

:12
Given sellers play the strategy prole A, the expected payo¤ of bidder i is given by13
12Heremi0() is the probability with which bidder i does not enter the market, andm i0 () is the probability
with which another bidder does not enter the market. mij() and m ij () are the probabilities, with which
bidder i and another bidder, respectively, go to seller j = 1; 2; :::; J:
13The expected payo¤ of each bidder can be dened in a similar way when other bidders play asymmetric
(mixed) strategies. In this case the expected payo¤ Rij(Aj ; ) will depend on the probabilities with which
each rival of bidder i visits seller j. To conserve space I do not introduce these payo¤s here as they are not
needed for the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium.
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ERi
 
A;mi(A);m i(A)

=
JX
j=1
mij(A) 

Rij(Aj ;m
 i
j (A))  c

:
2.4 Equilibrium
I now dene the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium for this decentralized trading
game.
Denition 1 The sellers strategy prole A and the (behavioral) bidder strategy prole
m() constitute a (symmetric subgame perfect) equilibrium, if they satisfy the following
conditions:
Buyer behavior:
(B1) Buyers play a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in every subgame A.
ERi
 
A;mi(A);m i(A)
  ERi A;mi;m i(A);8A 2 AJ ;8i; 8mi 2 [0; 1]; (BN)
mi(A) = m i(A);8A 2 AJ ;8i: (BS)
(B2) Buyers do not change their distribution across sellers unless a seller deviates to
a mechanisms that o¤ers them a higher or a lower payo¤. That is, for all ~Aj
such that Rij

~Aj ;m

j (Aj ; A j)

= Rij

Aj ;m

j (Aj ; A j)

;the equality mj ( ~Aj ; A j) =
mj (Aj ; A j) holds.
Seller behavior:
(S1) Sellers play a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the rst stage of the game.
j

Aj ; A

 j ;m
()

 j

Aj ; A

 j ;m
()

;8Aj 2 A: (SN)
A1 = A

2 =    = AJ : (SS)
Equilibrium behavior prescribes that sellers choose the same trade mechanism, and
buyers distribute across sellers in the same fashion for each A. This continuation equilib-
rium is appealing at least for three reasons. First, it guarantees a symmetric treatment
of buyers. Requiring symmetry appears quite intuitive because buyers are assumed to be
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ex ante identical and anonymous, and there is no device in this game allowing them to
coordinate. Second, the number of bidders in each auction will be stochastic, and this is
a phenomenon frequently observed in practice. Finally, the probability of entry changes
continuously with the mechanismsvariables, e.g. entry fees or reserve prices. This will be
helpful for the characterization of equilibrium.
3 Organization of the analysis and results
The rst step of the analysis is to explore what kind of trade mechanisms could possibly be
equilibria. Theorem 1 provides an answer to this question by asserting that in equilibrium
(if one exists) sellers hold auctions. Holding an auction in this type of model actually means
using a trade mechanism which assigns the good to the participant with the highest valua-
tion (for a similar interpretation see McAfee 1993, p. 1292). Note the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem applies here because by assumption buyer valuations are private, symmetric and
independent. Hence, the equilibrium auctions will not be uniquely dened (e.g. sellers can
use rst price, second price, an all pay auction, etc.). Table 1 provides a useful illustra-
tion of the remaining results and arguments. The rows in this table present conditions
on trade mechanisms which dene the sets A, 
 and 
e. The rst three conditions were
already dened in the previous section. E¢ ciency" requires the object be always granted
to the participant with the highest valuation; Constant entrance fee" requires the use of
an auction with an entrance fee that does not depend on the number of actual bidders.
A 
 
e
Feasibility + + +
Anonymity + + +
Incentive Compatibility + + +
E¢ ciency + +
Constant entry fee +
Table 1: Mechanism sets and conditions. The + sign denotes the conditions satised by
the mechanisms from the sets A (strategy set of the original game), 
 (auctions with zero
reserve price and entry fees that might depend on the number of bidders) and 
e (auctions
with zero reserve price and entry fee independent of the number of actual bidders).
Let us consider mechanisms giving every buyer a constant expected payment when all
buyers visit this mechanism with a certain constant probability (say m). Lemma 1 states
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that among all these mechanisms, the ones maximizing sellers expected payo¤must satisfy
the "E¢ ciency" condition. This argument narrows down the set of mechanism that can
constitute an equilibrium, and upon considering the incentive compatibility constraint,
only the mechanisms from the set 
 remain possible equilibrium candidates. That is,
the equilibrium trade mechanisms can only be auctions with a zero reserve price, and an
entrance fee that might depend on the number of the participating bidders.
Let us focus now on the subset 
e consisting only of auctions with a uniform entrance
fee (i.e. entrance fee independent of the number actual bidders). Theorem 2 claims every
equilibrium of the game with strategy 
e is also an equilibrium of the game with the larger
strategy set 
. This result allows me to focus on the game with strategy set 
e, in which
sellers choose a single variablethe entry fee in their auction. Theorem 3 then provides an
explicit solution for the entry fee of the unique equilibrium of the game with strategy set

e. This is also an equilibrium of the original game formulated in the model.
The essence of the analysis presented in Theorem 3 is best conveyed by considering
the case of two sellers and two or more buyers. Assume the cost of entering the market is
zero and two sellers hold auctions with an entry fee of C. In the continuation equilibrium,
buyers randomize equally between visiting the two sellers. When one of the sellers, say
seller j; raises his fee to Cj , this seller will see an outow of buyers because customers will
redistribute across the two sellers in a way that their expected gain is equal at each seller.
Note that the reduction in the probability with which buyers visit seller j depends only on
the di¤erence between Cj and C rather than on their actual values. By raising his entry
fee beyond C; seller j faces a tradeo¤. On the one hand, he is able to extract an additional
prot from bidders who stay in the auction in the form of increased entry fees.14 On the
other hand, he loses prot from bidders who exit the auction. For a xed di¤erence Cj C,
and thus xed outow of buyers, the loss of prot increases in C because the buyers who
leave the auction are not paying this entry fee anymore. The equilibrium level of the entry
fee is such that, for entry fees Cj higher than this level, the loss incurred by the outow of
buyers exceed the benet; and for entry fees Cj lower than this level the benet from the
inux of additional buyers is not su¢ cient to compensate for the loss associated with the
reduction of the entry fee for all participants. The proof of Theorem 3 makes this argument
14There is a secondary e¤ect that goes in the opposite direction. It is caused by the reduced buyer
competition in the auction due to the outow of buyers. This e¤ect is smaller than the one incurred by
the increased entry fee, and generally the consumer surplus decreases if one of the seller raises his fee. This
e¤ect does not play a role for the arguments that follow.
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precise and obtains an explicit solution. This proof relies on an innovation that might be
applicable in related auction games with random entry. Rather than formulating the payo¤
of seller j as a function of the entry fees C and Cj , this payo¤ is expressed in terms of C and
the probabilitym with which seller j is visited. This formulation allows me to link the total
surplus of all buyers and seller j to the expected payo¤ of an individual buyer (Lemmas
3 and 4). This yields a convenient representation of seller js payo¤, j(m;C). Then, the
equilibrium entry fee C is determined by the condition that j(m;C) reaches a maximum
when buyers visit each seller with the same probability (with two sellers m = 1=2, which
implies Cj = C).
The rest of the analysis provides some comparative static results. Theorem 4 states that
the equilibrium entry fee converges to zero as the size of the market increases. Hereby I let
the number of agents go to innity, but keep the ratio of buyers to sellers constant. A similar
approach is taken in Theorem 5, which shows that buyers obtain a higher surplus than
sellers in equilibrium if the market is large. In particular, I obtain a closed form solution
for the buyer and seller surplus when the buyer valuations are uniformly distributed, and
the number of agents converges to innity.
4 Theorems and proofs
The rst theorem narrows down the set of mechanisms that can potentially be equilibria.
Theorem 1 (i) In equilibrium, sellers use mechanisms that assign the item to the highest-
valuation bidder, if this valuation is higher than sellers use value of the good.
(ii) The equilibrium mechanisms are (expected) payo¤ equivalent to a second-price auction
with a reserve price equal to sellers use value, and an entrance fee, which might
depend on the number of participating bidders.
Proof. The proof of part (i) of the theorem begins with the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider the mechanisms, which give every bidder an expected payo¤ of R,
provided all bidders visit this mechanism with a probability of m. Among these mechanisms,
the ones that maximize the expected payo¤ of the seller, assign the object with a probability
of one to the participant with the highest valuation, provided that this valuation exceeds the
use value of the seller.
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The sketch of the proof will be briey illustrated here (see the Appendix for details).
The expected payo¤ of the seller is the joint surplus of all agents (the sum of the payo¤s
of all bidders and the seller) minus the expected payo¤ of the bidders, which is assumed
constant, and equals I m R. Therefore, to maximize his expected payo¤, the seller should
maximize the expected joint surplus resulting from trade (the surplus of all bidders and
the seller). For any number of buyers, the expected joint surplus is the sum of the bidder
valuations multiplied by their probabilities of winning the item. Obviously, this surplus
is maximized when the good is always assigned to the highest valuation bidder with a
probability of one.15
Now let n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig be the total number of bidders visiting a certain seller j. Let
mechanism Aj assign the good to the highest valuation bidder, and let this mechanism
be incentive compatible. The winning probability of a bidder with a valuation xi who
reports a valuation of ~xi is P
(n)
i ( ~xi)  [F ( ~xi)]n 1: The incentive compatibility condition
(IC) requires ddxi (xi  P
(n)
Aj
( ~xi)   ZnAj ( ~xi)) j ~xi=xi= 0, and applying the Envelope Theorem,
I obtain ddxi (E
(n)
Aj
( ~xi j xi) = @@xi (E
(n)
Aj
( ~xi j xi)) j ~xi=xi= [F (xi)]n 1. The expected prot of a
bidder with a valuation of xi is thus
E
(n)
Aj
(xi j xi) = ( Cn) +
Z xi
0
[F (z)]n 1dz;
where ( Cn) is the expected prot of a bidder with the lowest valuation (xi = 0). The
amount Cn is the entrance fee that each bidder has to pay when participating with (n  
1) other bidders (if Cn is negative, the seller is actually giving a participation bonus to
bidders). If there is no entry fee or bonus, the ex-ante payo¤ of a bidder is
Bn =
Z 1
0
Z x
0
[F (z)]n 1dzdF (x):
A standard result in auction theory (see e.g. Riley and Samuelson 1981, McAfee and
McMillan 1987a) establishes that a seller, who auctions o¤ an item to n bidders, receives
an expected payo¤ equal to the expected value of the second order statistic given by
15McAfee and McMillan (1987b) provide a similar argument in a setting with one seller and an outside
option. For any number of participating bidders, sellers expected revenue is the winning bidders expected
valuation minus the expected prot of the participating bidders. Thus, for any number of bidders, the seller
should award the good so as to maximize the expected valuation of the winner. This can only be done by
always assigning the good to the highest valuation bidder.
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Sn = n 
Z 1
0
[x  f(x) + F (x)  1]  [F (x)]n 1dx:
Amechanism from the set 
 can now be identied by the participation fees C1; C2; :::; CI
in the cases of 1; 2; :::; and I participating bidders, respectively.

Let ACj 2 
e be a revenue equivalent mechanism to a second price auction with an
entry fee of C (independent of the number of participants).
Theorem 2 If the seller strategy prole AC = (AC1 ; A
C
2 ; :::; A
C
I ) is an equilibrium of the
game with a strategy space 
e, (i.e. the game in which sellers compete by setting a constant
entry fee in their auctions), then it is an equilibrium of the game with a strategy set 
 (the
game in which sellers can condition their entry fee on the number of participants).
The idea of the proof is simple, and it will shortly be presented here. A detailed proof
can be found in the Appendix. Assume by contradiction that AC is not an equilibrium
of the game in which sellers can condition their entry fee on the number of participants
(the game with strategy set 
). Then, a deviation mechanism ~Aj for a certain seller j
exists, which gives this seller a higher expected payo¤. Let buyers visit this seller with a
probability of ~m. Given this probability, the expected payment of a bidder can be divided
into an expected payment arising from his participation in the auction and an expected
entry fee payment. Construct now a new mechanism, A ~Cj , which charges a constant entry
fee equal to the expected entry fee payment of ~Aj . The mechanisms A
~C
j and ~Aj are
auctions with entry fees such that buyers are paying on average the same entry fee (if they
visit seller j with a probability of ~m). Applying condition (B2) stated in the equilibrium
denition, I conclude that bidders visit seller j with a probability of ~m when seller j uses
either ~Aj or A
~C
j . That means A
~C
j and ~Aj generate the same expected payo¤ to the seller.
Because ~Aj was a protable deviation for seller j, playing A
~C
j must be more protable for
seller j compared to playing ACj . This argument delivers the desired contradiction to the
assumption that ACj is an equilibrium mechanism and completes the proof.
This theorem has a merit on its own as its validity goes beyond the scope of the present
setting. The only assumption needed for the proof is risk neutrality, and the theorem holds
in private and common value environments in which bidder valuations might possibly be
interdependent. In this model the theorem allows me to focus on the game in which sellers
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compete by setting entry fees independent of the number of bidders. The next theorem
characterizes the equilibrium entry fee.
Theorem 3 In equilibrium, sellers hold auctions with an entry fee. The entry fee is
uniquely determined by the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer val-
uations, and the cost of entering the market. Let
R[m] :=
IX
n=1
Pr[n  1;m] Bn
be the payo¤ of a bidder who participates in an auction with no entry fee or reserve
price, provided all other bidders participate in the same auction with a probability of m;
and let
E :=
1
J
 d
dm
(R[
1 m
J   1 ]) jm=1=J :
The equilibrium entry fee is given as follows:
(1) c < R[1=J ] E. Sellers use an entry fee equal to E: All buyers enter the market with
a probability of one and receive an expected payo¤ in excess of their cost.
(2) R[1=J ]  E  c < R[1=J ]. All buyers enter the market with a probability of one and
just cover their cost of entry. All sellers use an entry fee of R[1=J ]  c > 0. As the
cost of entering the market (c) increases, all sellers lower their entry fees so as to
allow bidders to enter the market with a probability of one.
(3) c  R[1=J ]. Buyers enter the market with a probability smaller than one. The entry
fee in the equilibrium auctions is zero. In particular, if c  R[0]; buyers stay out of
the market with a probability of one.
The graph below illustrates how the entry fee depends on the buyer cost of entering
the market for a given distribution of buyer valuations and a given number of buyers and
sellers.
For small values of the entry cost c, sellers charge an entry fee of E and buyers enter
with a probability of one. As the cost of entry increases, sellers collectively lower the entry
fee so as to allow buyers to enter with a probability of one. This pattern continues until
the cost of entering the market becomes so large that sellers reduce their entry fees to
zero. When c rises further, sellers keep their entry fees at zero, but buyers start leaving
15
Figure 1: Equilibrium entry fee as a function of the buyer cost of entering the market.
the market with a positive probability. When the entry cost reaches the critical level R[0],
buyers stay out of the market completely.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Let seller j charge an entry fee of Cj and let all other sellers charge an entry fee of C.
The expected prot of seller j is given by
j(Cj ; C) =
IX
n=1
Pr[n;m]  Sn + I m  Cj ;
where m is the probability that buyers go to seller j given the entry fees Cj and C.
How does the probability m depend on the entry fees Cj and C? Recall that R[m] is the
expected payo¤ of a bidder who participates in an auction without an entry fee or a reserve
price, provided the other bidders enter the same auction with a probability of m. In the
symmetric independent private value model, the function R[m] is decreasing in m. That
is, the higher the probability that other bidders attend the same auction, the lower the
expected surplus of each individual bidder.16 This property of the bidder payo¤ ensures
16To prove this consider an auction with no entry fee or a reserve price in which bidder i participates
with a probability of one. Let all other bidders participate with a probability of m, except for one of them,
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that for each combination of entry fees charged by sellers, buyers distribute across sellers
in a unique way. Let me break down all possible scenarios for the distribution of buyers
across sellers depending on the entry fees in three categories.
Case A. All buyers enter the market with a probability of one and distribute across all sellers.
In this case the entry probability m is determined by the equilibrium condition
R[m]  Cj = R[1 m
J   1 ]  C; (A)
if this equation has a solution m 2 [0; 1], and for this solution the inequality R[m] C 
c holds. That is, buyers nd it protable to enter the market as they earn a surplus not
lower than their cost of entry. Buyers visit seller j with a probability of m and each of the
other sellers with a probability of 1 mJ 1 . Equation (A) ensures that each buyer earns the
same surplus by going to any of the sellers given the randomization strategy of the other
buyers.
Case B. Buyers enter the market with a probability smaller than one. This is the case when
equation (A) has a solution m 2 [0; 1]; but for this solution R[m]   C < c. In this
case buyers visit seller j with a probability determined by the equation
R[m]  Cj = c; (B)
if this equation has a solution in the interval [0; 1].
Case C. Consider the constellations of Cj and C for which equation (A) is not satised for
m 2 [0; 1]. I will discuss in turn the two possible cases in which the solution of
equation (A) is either greater than one or below zero.
(C1) Equation (A) has a solution m > 1. Seller j charges such a low entry fee that buyers
prefer to visit this seller with a probability of one rather than to visit any of the other
sellers (i.e. the inequality R[1] Cj > R[0] C holds). Three cases now are possible
depending on the solution of equation (B).
named k, who participates with a probability of mk. The payo¤ of bidder i is R[mk;m] =
PI 2
n=0 Pr[n;m] 
(mk  Bn+1 + (1   mk)Bn). The derivative with respect to the entry probability of the other bidders is
dR[m]
dm
= (I   1)  @R[mk;m]
@mk
jmk=m= (I   1) 
PI 2
n=0 Pr[n;m](Bn+1   Bn) < 0; where Bn is the expected
surplus of a bidder who participates in an auction with (n  1) other bidders, and this expected surplus
decreases in the the number of rivals (n  1). The derivative is negative because Bn+1 < Bn for all n.
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C1.1. Equation (B) has a solution m 2 [0; 1]: Buyers randomize between not entering
the market and going to seller j.
C1.2. Equation (B) has a solution m > 1. Buyers go to seller j with a probability
of one and earn a higher surplus than their cost of entry (i.e. the inequality
R[1]  Cj > c holds).
C1.3. Equation (B) has a solution m < 0. Seller j receives no customers (i.e. the
inequality R[0]  Cj < c holds).
(C2) Equation (A) has a solution m < 0. Seller j charges a very high entry fee and receives
no buyers (the inequality R[0]   Cj < R[0]   C holds). Customers do not enter the
market.
The analysis focuses on the symmetric equilibrium the equilibrium in which sellers
charge the same entry fee, and buyers randomize symmetrically across sellers. To derive
this equilibrium, I need to determine an entry fee C such that, if all sellers charge this
entry fee, no deviation of a single seller Cj exists, which increases the expected payo¤ of
this seller. The next lemma demonstrates that, for the purpose of the equilibrium analysis,
it is su¢ cient to analyze only the deviations Cj for which either equation (A) or equation
(B) has a solution m 2 [0; 1].
Lemma 2 Let all sellers charge an entry fee C: For any deviation Cj of a single seller,
for which the equations (A) and (B) do not have a solution m 2 [0; 1], there exists a weakly
more protable deviation ~Cj of this seller

i.e. j( ~Cj ; C)  j(Cj ; C)

for which at least
one of the equations (A) or (B) has a solution m 2 [0; 1].
The proof of the lemma is rather straightforward. The only cases for which neither (A)
nor (B) holds are the cases C1.2., C1.3. and (C2). In case C1.2. seller j leaves too much
surplus to buyers. Buyers go to this seller with a probability of one and earn a surplus in
excess of their cost. In this case seller j can raise his entry fee to the point until one of the
equations (A) or (B) holds form = 1 without losing buyers and increase his expected prot.
In case C1.3. seller j receives no customers and earns a zero prot. In this case, lowering
Cj in a way that the equality R[0]  Cj = c holds will lead to the same expected prot of
zero for this seller. In case (C2), seller j also receives no customers. In this case, lowering
Cj so that either equation (A) or equation (B) is satised for m = 0 will not reduce the
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payo¤ of seller j as this seller will still not be visited by buyers. These arguments establish
the stated result.
Because of this statement, it will be su¢ cient to describe the sellerspayo¤s only for
cases in which m behaves according to equation (A) or equation (B). When seller j chooses
an entry fee Cj ; seller j indirectly determines the entry probability m. Therefore, the
decision of seller j can alternatively be viewed as a choice of the entry probability m,
whereby the entry fee Cj is indirectly determined from equation (A) or equation (B). It
will be convenient to express the payo¤ of seller j as a function of m and C.
j(m;C) =
( PI
n=1 Pr[n;m]  Sn + I m  (R[m] R[1 mJ 1 ] + C) if eq. (A) holds,PI
n=1 Pr[n;m]  Sn + I m  (R[m]  c) if eq. (B) holds.
,
j(m;C) =
( PI
n=1 Pr[n;m]  Sn + I m R[m]  I m  (R[1 mJ 1 ]  C) if eq. (A) holds,PI
n=1 Pr[n;m]  Sn + I m R[m]  I m  c if eq. (B) holds.
Let me dene now the expected Joint Surplus of seller j and all buyers who visit him
with a probability of m by
JS(m) :=
IX
n=1
Pr[n;m]  Sn + I m R[m] =
IX
n=1
Pr[n;m]  (Sn + n Bn);
where the last expression is the weighted sum of the buyer and seller surplus for all
possible numbers of participating buyers. The payo¤ of seller j can be expressed as
j(m;C) =
(
JS(m)  I m  (R[1 mJ 1 ]  C) if eq. (A) holds,
JS(m)  I m R[m]  I m  c if eq. (B) holds.
Next, I make use of a well-known result in auction theory presented below.
Lemma 3 (Levin and Smith, 1994) In the symmetric independent private value model,
when one bidder joins an auction in which (n  1) bidders are participating (with a proba-
bility of one), the change in the Joint Surplus is equal to the individual bidders gain:
(Sn + n Bn)  (Sn 1 + (n  1) Bn 1) = Bn:
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A concise proof of this lemma can be found in Levin and Smith (1994, p. 592). This
lemma is useful for the proof of the following statement.
Lemma 4 Assume all bidders visit a seller with a probability of m. The marginal change
of the Joint Surplus equals the sum of all biddersgains:
d
dm
(JS(m)) = I R[m]:
The proof of the lemma is provided in the Appendix. In a symmetric equilibrium sellers
use the same entry fee (say C) and this entry fee is such that if all other sellers charge C,
it is optimal for seller j to also charge the same fee. In other words, the equilibrium fee C
is such that j(Cj ; C) is maximized for Cj = C. Here, the expected payo¤ of seller j is
expressed in terms of C and m (instead of Cj). Hence, in the case that equation (A) holds,
the equilibrium condition can be reformulated to require that C is such that j(m;C) is
maximized for m = 1=J (which implies Cj = C).17 Using the relationship presented in the
previous lemma yields the following rst order condition:
d
dm
j(m;C) =
(
I R[m]  I  ddm(m  (R[1 mJ 1 ]  C)) = 0 if eq. (A) holds,
I R[m]  I  c = 0 if eq. (B) holds.
Observe that for m = 1=J the equality R[m] = R[1 mJ 1 ] holds. If the entry probability
is determined by equation (A), the solution of the rst equation with respect to C yields
the equilibrium entry fee
E =
1
J
 d
dm
(R(
1 m
J   1 )) jm=1=J :
The rst order condition in the case of equation (B) requires R[m] c = 0. Equation (B)
itself requires R[m] Cj = c, which combined with the previous equation yields Cj = 0.18
It remains to clarify now for which values of the entry cost c the entry probability is
determined by equation (A) and by equation (B).
17Analogously, in case B the equilibrium condition can be restated to require that C be such that for the
value of m which maximizes j(m;C) equation B is satised.
18The convexity of j(m;C) in m guarantees that the rst order condition yields a unique maximum
(recall that R[m] is decreasing in m).
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Case 1. When all sellers charge E and c < R[1=J ]   E, buyers indeed are willing to
enter the market with a probability of one as they earn a higher surplus than their cost
of entry. The entry probability is determined by equation (A). In this case, as has been
shown, if all sellers charge E it is optimal for seller j to also use the same entry fee.
Case 2. When all sellers charge an entry fee of R[1=J ] c and R[1=J ] E  c < R[1=J ],
buyers enter the market with a probability of one and are just able to cover their cost of
entry. It will be shown that no deviation to a higher or a lower entry fee is protable for
seller j.
If seller j deviates to an entry fee higher than R[1=J ] c, buyer surplus from entering the
market will decrease, and buyers will stay out of the market with positive probability. That
means the entry probability m and the entry fee Cj will behave according to equation (B).
In this case the payo¤ of seller j decreases in Cj (the maximum is attained when Cj = 0).
Raising Cj beyond R[1=J ]  c is thus not protable for seller j.
If seller j lowers Cj below R[1=J ]   c buyer surplus from entering the market will in-
crease, and buyers will enter with a probability of one and realize a higher surplus than the
entry cost. The entry probability m and Cj will behave according to equation (A). When
Cj = C = R[1=J ] c < E buyers visit seller j with a probability ofm = 1=J , and the deriva-
tive of the expected payo¤of seller j in case A is
d
dm
j(m;C) j m=1=J = I R[m]  I 
d
dm
(m  (R[1 m
J   1 ]  C)) jm=1=J
= I  [R[m] R[1 m
J   1 ] + C  
1
J
 d
dm
(R(
1 m
J   1 )] jm=1=J
= I  (C   E) < 0:
That means raising m above 1=J , or equivalently lowering Cj below R[1=J ]  c, is also
unprotable for seller j.
Case 3. When c  R[1=J ] and sellers charge an entry fee of zero, bidders enter
the market with a probability smaller than one. The entry probability is determined
by equation (B), and, as has been shown, the payo¤ of each seller j is maximized for Cj =
0: 
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5 Comparative Statics
In this section I will characterize the equilibrium entry fee in large markets, and will discuss
this model relative to the literature on decentralized markets with an innite number of
buyers and sellers. I will also explore how the presence of more sellers impacts the entry
fees used in equilibrium, and in particular how the monopoly case compares to the case of
two sellers.
Following the approach by McAfee (1993) and Peters and Severinov (1997), I hold the
ratio of buyers to sellers constant, k = I=J , and consider a sequence of markets for which
J = 2; 3; :::. I focus on the interesting case in which buyer cost of entry is so low that in
equilibrium no buyers stay out of the market.
Theorem 4 As the number of buyers and sellers converges to innity, but their ratio
remains constant, i.e. I = k  J; the entry fee converges to zero:
limEJ;kJ
J!1
= 0:
See the Appendix for a proof. This theorem demonstrates that a higher number of sell-
ers leads to a more intense competition among sellers despite the proportionally increasing
number of buyers. The intuition for this regularity is best conveyed by the following ar-
gument. When the number of sellers increases, the impact of each individual seller on the
expected gain that buyers obtain at other sellers decreases. When the number of sellers is
very large, this impact is very small, and if this e¤ect is neglected entirely, the expected
payo¤ of bidders who visit other sellers will be constant. A seller confronted with buyers
who have a constant outside option optimally sets a zero entry fee (see e.g. Levin and
Smith 1994). Ignoring this e¤ect entirely is indeed at the core of the limiting equilibrium
concepts proposed in McAfee (1993) and Peters and Severinov (1997). My analysis illus-
trates how the equilibrium entry fee diminishes when this e¤ect decreases with the size of
the market. The next table provides the entry fee EJ;kJ depending on the number of sellers
for the case of uniformly distributed buyer valuations19 and markets with ratios k = 1; 2
and 3.
19For a uniform distribution of buyer valuations it can easily be shown that Sn = n 1n+1 , Bn =
1
n(n+1)
and
R[m] :=
PI
n=1 Pr[n  1;m] Bn.
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# sellers Ratio of buyers to sellers k=I/J
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
100
1000
J !1
k=1 k=2 k=3
0.1667 0.2000 0.1473
0.0830 0.0920 0.0701
0.0552 0.0592 0.0456
0.0412 0.0435 0.0338
0.0328 0.0343 0.0268
0.0273 0.0284 0.0222
0.0233 0.0241 0.0189
0.0203 0.0210 0.0164
0.0181 0.0186 0.0146
0.0016 0.0016 0.0013
0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
0 0 0
Table 2: Equilibrium entry fee for uniformly distributed buyer values, di¤erent number
of sellers, and di¤erent buyer/seller ratios.
The calculations are performed with Mathematica and the numbers are rounded to four
decimal places. Let us turn now to the monopoly case. When c > R[1] the monopolists
expected payo¤ is given by the function ~j(m;Cj), and, as already discussed (see Case 3
of Theorem 3), this function reaches its maximum for Cj = 0 (for an analysis along similar
lines see Levin and Smith 1994). When c < R[1] buyers enter the market with a probability
of one and earn a surplus of R[1]   c. In this case the seller can expropriate the entire
surplus from buyers by charging an entry fee of R[1]   c. The graph below provides the
entry fee in markets with 3 bidders, and a monopoly and duopoly seller market.
Interestingly, the availability of a second seller leads to higher entry fees. To gain
intuition into this phenomenon it is useful to compare how raising the entry fee impacts
the entry into a sellers mechanism. In the case of monopoly, the seller optimally charges
an entry fee that expropriates the entire surplus from buyers. If the seller raises further his
entry fee, buyers will start exiting the market. How is the duopoly situation di¤erent? If
sellers use the same entry fee as in the monopoly case, buyers will distribute across the two
sellers with a probability of 1/2, and will face lower competition from other buyers. Their
expected payo¤will be higher. Thus, if one of the sellers slightly raises his entry fee, buyers
will not exit the market, but will shift probability towards visiting the other seller. As a
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Figure 2: Numerical example: equilibrium entry fees in a market with three buyers, and
one seller (the rm line) and two sellers (the dash line), respectively. Buyer values are
uniformly distributed.
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result, the buyer competition with the other seller will increase, and the expected payo¤ of
buyers will decrease. The redistribution of buyers will continue until their expected payo¤s
from visiting the two sellers equalize. That is, raising the entry fee in the case of duopoly
will lead to a lower outow of buyers as compared to the monopoly case.20 Because of
this, a seller is losing less customers by raising his entry fee in the case of duopoly. This
creates an incentive for the sellers to increase their entry fees beyond the entry fee that a
monopolist would use as was illustrated in the graph.
5.1 Buyer and seller surplus
This model assigns a di¤erent role to buyers and sellers. Sellers seem to play a more active
role in the market the role of the mechanism designer but, as we will see, this role does
not seem to translate into a higher surplus. The next theorem establishes how the trade
surplus is split between buyers and sellers in large markets.
Theorem 5 Consider a market with J sellers and k  J buyers. Let buyer values be uni-
formly distributed, and let the cost of entry into the market be zero. As J !1 the expected
surplus of a buyer converges to
1  (1+k)
ek
k2
and the expected surplus of a seller converges to
(
2 + k
k  ek +
k   2
k
):
See the Appendix for a proof. When the market is populated by an equal number of
buyers and sellers, i.e. when k = 1; buyers receive a surplus of e 1e t 0:264, and sellers
obtain 3 ee t 0:104. The next table gives a more complete picture of buyer and seller
surplus for markets of increasing size and equal number of buyers and sellers.
20When going from the monopoly to the duopoly case, the number of units goes from 1 to 2. Thus, not
only the competition between the sellers, but also the larger total surplus contributes to the result. Another
type of comparison would be a monopoly seller with 2 units, and two sellers o¤ering one unit each. In this
case the monopoly seller will charge an entry fee that allows him to expropriate the entire surplus from
buyers without causing buyers to exit the market. In a duopoly market buyers in general have a positive
surplus.
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# sellers BS SS TS BS/TS (%) SS/TS (%)
2 0.1666 0.2500 0.4166 40.0 60.0
3 0.2226 0.1756 0.3982 55.9 44.1
4 0.2386 0.1513 0.3899 61.2 38.8
5 0.2460 0.1392 0.3852 63.9 36.1
6 0.2502 0.1318 0.3820 65.5 34.5
7 0.2528 0.1271 0.3799 66.5 33.5
8 0.2547 0.1236 0.3783 67.3 32.7
9 0.2561 0.1210 0.3771 67.9 32.1
10 0.2570 0.1192 0.3762 68.3 31.7
100 0.2637 0.1050 0.3687 71.5 28.5
1000 0.2641 0.1038 0.3679 71.8 28.2
J !1 (e  2) =e (3  e) =e 1=e 71.8 28.2
Table 3: BSbuyer surplus; SSseller surplus; TS=SS+BStotal trade surplus; BS/TS
(%)percentage of total surplus that accrues to buyers; SS/TS (%)percentage of total
surplus that accrues to sellers. Buyer values are uniformly distributed; cost of entering the
market is zero.
As the table illustrates, only in small markets (2 buyers/2 sellers, and 3 buyers/3 sellers)
seller surplus exceeds buyer surplus. When the number of agents increases, the competition
among sellers reduces their share of the surplus. It can also be observed that the size of the
market exacerbates the coordination problems of buyers, and the total surplus converges
down to 1=e as J !1.
6 Conclusion
I presented an analytically tractable model of decentralized trading in which sellers compete
for buyers by designing transaction mechanisms. Sellers can o¤er any direct, incentive-
compatible and individually rational mechanism. The model allows for any nite number
of buyer and sellers, and the interaction among market participants is purely strategic.
Upon observing the available mechanisms, buyers symmetrically randomize across sellers.
This assumption generates a pattern of buyer behavior with several attractive features.
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First, this behavior does not presume any sort of coordination among buyers, and assures
that buyers are treated symmetrically. Second, buyers distribute stochastically across
sellers. Some sellers might on occasions be visited by a very high number of buyers, others
by a very low numbers of buyers, and some might even not be visited by buyers at all.
This is a feature often observed in reality. Third, the entry probability in each auction
varies continuously with the parameters of the mechanisms (e.g. entry fees), and this
allows characterization of the equilibrium for markets of various sizes. By allowing for any
number of buyers and sellers, the analysis presents a generalization of Levin and Smiths
(1994) monopoly model.
The model states comparative statics predictions that are not available in the received
models on decentralized trade. First, duopoly sellers charge higher entry fees compared to a
monopoly; yet, as the size of the market increases, the equilibrium entry fees decrease, and
eventually converge to zero. Second, the increased number of buyers and sellers exacerbates
the coordination problem, and increases the probability that items remain unsold (although
this probability has a lower bound). Third, in large markets buyers obtain a higher share
of the surplus, and this share increases with the size of the market. These insights should
guide empirical research on decentralized markets along new lines ones that account for
the endogeneity of the trading institutions and the size of the market.
The model has both positive and normative implications. Taken to real world markets,
the model o¤ers a rationale for the frequent use of absolute auctions (auctions with no
reserve price or entry fee). These auctions are popular in a variety of markets ranging
from real estate and restaurant equipment, to imported goods, and a number of other
goods o¤ered online (see, e.g., Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1987, Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1993).
Normatively, the model suggests that sellers should not post reserve prices, or charge entry
fees when competing with other sellers, especially when the size of the market is large, or
buyers incur substantial costs of entering the market.
The analysis has two important limitations. First, it paints a static picture of trade.
Once buyers stochastically distribute across sellers, and the transactions take place, there
still remain buyers and sellers who were unable to trade.21 It can be expected that they
might attempt to trade at a later point, and this will have an e¤ect on the transaction
mechanisms used by sellers. Allowing for multiple rounds of trading will the next logical
step along this line of research. Second, the model does not treat buyers and sellers
21When the market consists of J sellers and k  J buyers, the probability that a seller will not be visited
by customers converges to e k as J !1.
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symmetrically: sellers are shaping the trading institutions, and buyers are responding to
sellers o¤ers. An alternative approach will allow for intermediaries who facilitate the
interaction between both market sides by designing trading mechanisms in which both
buyers and sellers participate. These issues remain exciting topics for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2:
The seller chooses Aj so as to maximize his expected payo¤,
j

Aj ;m

=
IX
n=1
Pr[n;m]  n 
Z 1
0
Z
(n)
Aj
(xi)dF (xi);
subject to the constraint that the expected payo¤ of each bidder equals R :
R = Rij

Aj ;m

=
IX
n=1
Pr[n  1;m] 
Z 1
0

xi  P (n)Aj (xi)  Z
(n)
Aj
(xi)

dF (xi):
The right hand side of the expression sums over the expected payo¤ of a bidder who
faces 0, 1; ..., I 1 rivals respectively, multiplied by the probabilities for these events. This
constraint can be rewritten as a sum of the expected payo¤s of all bidders:
I m R =
IX
n=1
Pr[n;m]  n 
Z 1
0

xi  P (n)Aj (xi)  Z
(n)
Aj
(xi)

dF (xi):
Thus, the seller chooses Aj to maximize the expression
IX
n=1
Pr[n;m]  n 
Z 1
0

xi  P (n)Aj (xi)

dF (xi)  I m R:
This expression obviously reaches a maximum whenZ 1
0

xi  P (n)Aj (xi)

dF (xi)
is maximized for every n = 1; 2; :::; I. Because x i 2 [0; 1]n 1 we have
P
(n)
Aj
(xi) =
Z
[0;1]n 1
pi(xi; x i)dF (x i)
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and since I consider only anonymous mechanisms (see condition (AN)), I obtainZ 1
0

xi  P (n)j (xi)

dF (xi) =
1
n

Z
[0;1]n

xi  pi(x)

dF (x):
The expression reaches a maximum when, for every participating bidder i, probability
pi(x) is chosen so that
pi(x) =
(
1 if xi is the highest valuation,
0 otherwise.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Assume by contradiction AC is not an equilibrium in the game with a strategy set 
.
Hence, there exists a deviation mechanism ~Aj with entry fees ~C1; ~C2; :::; ~CI which brings
seller j a higher expected payo¤: j

~Aj ; ~m

> j

ACj ; ~m

, where ~m is the probability
that bidders enter the mechanism of seller j . The expected payo¤ of bidder i is
Rij

~Aj ; ~m

=
IX
n=1
Pr[n  1; ~m] Bn  
IX
n=1
Pr[n  1; ~m]  ~Cn;
and of seller j is
j

~Aj ; ~m

=
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  Sn +
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  n  ~Cn:
Let us construct now a mechanism A ~Cj with a constant entry fee
~C =
IX
n=1
Pr[n  1; ~m]  ~Cn: (CE)
The equilibrium assumption (B2) guarantees that buyers will continue to visit seller j with
a probability of ~m because their expected payo¤ has not changed. The payo¤ of the seller
is now
j

A
~C
j ; ~m

=
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  Sn +
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  n  ~C =
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  Sn + I  ~m  ~C
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From equation (CE) follows
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  n  ~C =
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  n  ~Cn
because
I  ~m  ~C = I  ~m 
 
IX
n=1
Pr[n  1; ~m]  ~Cn
!
=
IX
n=1
Pr[n; ~m]  n  ~C:
As each bidder pays the same expected fee, the expected fees that the seller obtains in
the two mechanisms are equal. It follows
j

A
~C
j ; ~m

= j

~Aj ; ~m

> j

ACj ; ~m

:
The mechanism A ~Cj 2 
e brings seller j a higher expected payo¤ than the equilibrium
mechanism ACj , and this yields the desired contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Let JS(mi;m) denote the joint surplus of the seller and all bidders, if bidder i partici-
pates with a probability of mi and all other bidders with a probability of m. The expected
gain of bidder i is mi  R[m], and from Lemma 3 follows JS(mi;m) = mi  R[m]. The
identities
d
dm
(JS(m)) = I  @
@mi
(JS(mi;m) jmi=m= I R[m]
yield the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 4:
The entry fee is given by EJ;kJ = 1J  ddm(R[1 mJ 1 ]) jm=1=J :Observe that ddm(R[1 mJ 1 ]) =
  1J 1  dR[m]dm , and hence
EJ;kJ =   1
J  (J   1) 
dR[m]
dm
:
Let us denote by R[mi;m] the expected payo¤ of a bidder who participates in an
auction with no entry fee or a reserve price, given that all other bidders participate with a
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probability of m except for one, who enters the auction with a probability of mi. Then
dR[m]
dm
j m=1=J = I 
@
@mi
R[mi;m] jmi=m=1=J,
dR[m]
dm
j m=1=J = kJ 
@
@mi
(mi R[1;m] + (1 mi) R[0;m]),
dR[m]
dm
j m=1=J = kJ  (R[1;m] R[0;m]):
Hence
EJ;kJ =
k
J   1  (R[0;m] R[1;m]):
Recall that R[m] =
PI
n=1 Pr[n  1;m] Bn and observe that
R[0;m] R[1;m] =
kJX
n=1
Pr[n  1;m]  (Bn 1  Bn) <
kJX
n=1
Pr[n  1;m] B0 = B0:
The claim follows.
Proof of Theorem 5:
The seller surplus is given by:
lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n; 1=J ]  Sn = lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n; 1=J ]  n  1
n+ 1
= lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n; 1=J ] 

1  2
n+ 1

= lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n; 1=J ]  2  lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n; 1=J ]

1
n+ 1

= 1  lim
J!1
(1  1
J
)kJ   2  lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n; 1=J ]

1
n+ 1

=

1  1
ek

  2
 
1  k+1
ek

k
=
2 + k
k  ek +
k   2
k
:
The result presented in the last line is established by using the identityn
k

=
n
k


n  1
k   1

(I)
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and observing that
lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n; 1=J ]

1
n+ 1

= lim
J!1
1
k  J + 1
kJX
n=1

k  J + 1
n+ 1

1
J
n
1  1
J
kJ n
= lim
J!1
1
k  J + 1
kJ+1X
n=2

k  J + 1
n

1
J
n
1  1
J
kJ n+1
= lim
J!1
J
(k  J + 1)
kJ+1X
n=2

k  J + 1
n

1
J
n 1
1  1
J
kJ n+1
= lim
J!1
J
(k  J + 1)
 
1  (1  1J )kJ+1
 (k  J + 1)   1J   1  1J kJ
!
= lim
J!1
1
(k + 1J )
 
1  (1  1J )kJ+1
 (k + 1J )
 
1  1J
kJ
!
= lim
J!1
1
(k + 1J )
  lim
J!1
 
(1  1J )kJ+1
(k + 1J )
  (1  1
J
)kJ
!
=
1
k
  e
 k
k
  e k =
 
1  k+1
ek

k
:
In equilibrium buyers earn R[1=J ] minus the entry fee, which converges to zero as
J !1. Thus, the buyer surplus is given by22
lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n  1; 1=J ] Bn = lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n  1; 1=J ]  1
n(n+ 1)
= lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n  1; 1=J ] 

1
n
  1
n+ 1

= lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n  1; 1=J ]  1
n
  lim
J!1
kJX
n=1
Pr[n  1; 1=J ]  1
n+ 1
=
k   k
ek
k2
  k   1 +
1
ek
k2
=
1  (1+k)
ek
k2
:
22The expression in the last line is similarly obtained by changing the boundaries of the sum and using
identity (I).
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